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Suspicionless Policing
Julian A. Cook, III*
ABSTRACT
The tragic death of Elijah McClain—a twenty-three-year-old, slightly
built, unarmed African American male who was walking home along a sidewalk when he was accosted by three Aurora, Colorado police officers—epitomizes the problems with policing that have become a prominent topic of
national conversation. Embedded within far too many police organizations is
a culture that promotes aggressive investigative behaviors and a disregard for
individual liberties. Incentivized by a Supreme Court that has, over the course
of several decades, empowered the police with expansive powers, law enforcement organizations have often tested—and crossed—the constitutional limits
of their investigative authorities. And too often it is people of color, and African Americans in particular, who bear the brunt of these practices. Through a
review of the Supreme Court’s stop and frisk precedents and an examination
of police practices in various contexts, this Article examines this phenomenon
and explains why aggressive police practices, such as those observed in the
McClain case, are unlikely to abate in the years to come.
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INTRODUCTION
He was only twenty-three years old.1 A self-described introvert,
he was also a vegetarian, a massage therapist, and a self-taught violinist and guitarist who would use his musical talents to soothe stray animals.2 Among those who knew him, he had a reputation for being
gentle and kind. One person commented that he had a “child-like
spirit.”3 Another described him as “the sweetest, purest person I have
ever met.”4 And another said, “I don’t even think he would set a
mouse trap if there was a rodent problem.”5
He was Elijah McClain. During his lifetime, McClain was never a
household name.6 Even the tragic circumstances of his death failed to
generate meaningful national attention until the killing of George
Floyd reignited a national debate on the issue of race and policing.7
McClain was seemingly the very antithesis of a threatening individual
at five foot, six inches and 140 pounds.8 Yet on August 24, 2019 McClain, who like Floyd was African American, lost his life after three
Aurora, Colorado police officers—Nathan Woodyard, Jason Rosenblatt, and Randy Roedema—accosted McClain while he was returning
home from a convenience store.9
1 Claire Lampen, What We Know About the Killing of Elijah McClain, N.Y. MAG.: THE
CUT (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.thecut.com/2021/02/the-killing-of-elijah-mcclain-everything-weknow.html [https://perma.cc/2TTF-37S6]; Lucy Tompkins, Here’s What You Need to Know
About Elijah McClain’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/article/whowas-elijah-mcclain.html [https://perma.cc/4F4B-34UX]; Amir Vera, Elijah McClain Was a Massage Therapist Who ‘Wanted to Heal’ Others, His Mother Says, CNN (June 30, 2020, 3:05 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/30/us/elijah-mcclain-profile/index.html [https://perma.cc/TVU6N6FT].
2 Lampen, supra note 1; Tompkins, supra note 1; Vera, supra note 1.
3 Lampen, supra note 1 (quoting one of McClain’s friends and former massage clients,
April Young).
4 Id. (quoting another of McClain’s friends and former clients, Marna Arnett).
5 Alexander Nazaryan, ‘I’m Just Different’: The Family of Elijah McClain, a 23-Year-Old
Black Man Killed by Colorado Cops Almost a Year Ago, Is Still Waiting for Justice, YAHOO!
NEWS (June 27, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/im-just-different-the-family-of-elijah-mc-clain-a23-yearold-black-man-killed-by-colorado-cops-090048258.html [https://perma.cc/JEQ7-HF94].
6 See Alex Burness, Elijah McCain Is Becoming a Household Name. His Mother Is Hurt
that It’s Taken So Long, DENVER POST (June 27, 2020, 9:07 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/
2020/06/27/elijah-mcclain-sheneen-aurora-police-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/VA8T-BJCC].
7 See Tompkins, supra note 1 (explaining that George Floyd’s death sparked a review
across the nation of “older” cases involving police-involved killings); Colleen Slevin, A Year
After Elijah McClain’s Death, Activists Want Charges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 24, 2020), https:/
/apnews.com/article/a9624d527a8790c7b9c75199e475b384 [https://perma.cc/DP8G-GARB] (noting that many people were not aware of McClain’s case until the renewed attention on racial
injustice following Floyd’s death).
8 Tompkins, supra note 1.
9 Id.

R
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On August 24, 2019 at approximately 10:30 p.m. an individual
called 911 and reported that while he was walking he observed an
individual, later determined to be Elijah McClain, who looked
“sketchy.”10 The 911 caller added, however, that “he might be a good
person or a bad person.”11 The caller stated that as their pathways
crossed he noticed that McClain was wearing a mask and had put his
hands in the air.12 The caller did not report any criminal activity,
stated that he did not observe any weapons, and indicated that he was
not in any danger.13
After making a purchase at a local convenience store, McClain
was walking in the direction of his residence when Officers Woodyard,
Rosenblatt, and Roedema approached him and ordered him to stop.14
At the time, McClain had been wearing a ski mask, which he reportedly wore because his anemia made him particularly susceptible to
being cold.15 McClain eventually stopped, but insisted that he had a
right to continue to his home.16 An officer then attempted to physically restrain him, which McClain resisted to some extent.17 During
the confrontation, McClain at one point uttered, “I am an introvert.
Please respect the boundaries that I am speaking. . . . Leave me
10 Ella Torres, Special Prosecutor Will Investigate 2019 Death of 23-Year-Old Elijah McClain While in Custody, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2020, 2:53 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/publicpressure-mounts-revisit-2019-death-elijah-mcclain/story?id=71401918 [https://perma.cc/W5PJSF4W].
11

Id.

See Kelley Griffin & Hayley Sanchez, Thousands Call for Justice for Elijah McClain in a
Day of Music and Marching, CPR NEWS (June 27, 2020), https://www.cpr.org/2020/06/27/musicand-marches-to-honor-elijah-mcclain-and-call-for-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/Z7DK-CXG9]; Slevin, supra note 7.
12

R

Aurora Police, 911 Dispatch Call Regarding Elijah McClain, YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDD3mvNP2QQ (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).
13

14

Lampen, supra note 1; Tompkins, supra note 1.

Lampen, supra note 1; Michael Ruiz, Parents of Elijah McClain, Black Man Who Died
After Colorado Officers Put Him in Chokehold, Sues Cops and First Responders, FOX NEWS
(Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/elijah-mcclain-family-colorado-chokehold-suescops [https://perma.cc/T4JN-2REU].
15

R
R

16 See Aurora Police, Body Worn Camera Regarding the In-Custody Death of Elijah McClain, YOUTUBE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5NcyePEOJ8 (last visited Aug. 23, 2021) (recording how McClain, when he was being detained, told officers that he
was not doing anything wrong and that “I’m going home”); see also Knez Walker, Candace
Smith, Ignacio Torres, Deborah Kim, Allie Yang & Anthony Rivas, What Happened to Elijah
McClain? Protests Help Bring New Attention to His Death, ABC NEWS (June 30, 2020, 7:25 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/happened-elijah-mcclain-protests-bring-attention-death/story?id
=71523476 [https://perma.cc/892K-FTFJ] (reporting that McClain told officers “I’m going
home”).
17

See Lampen, supra note 1.
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alone.”18 He also made several pleas to be freed (which were ignored
by the officers), vomited, and indicated that he was unable to
breathe.19 McClain was ultimately forced to the ground.20
Eventually, McClain was put “in a carotid hold,” a procedure
which temporarily disrupts blood flow to the brain by applying pressure to the side of the neck.21 Aurora Fire Rescue and Falck Ambulance staff were eventually summoned to the scene22 and a paramedicadministered Ketamine drug was injected into him while the officers
held McClain to the ground.23 While en route to the hospital, McClain
went into cardiac arrest.24 Six days after the incident, McClain was
declared brain dead and removed from life support.25 According to his
family, McClain was “covered in bruises.”26
In November 2019, approximately three months after the incident, a decision was announced by the Adams County District Attorney that no charges would be filed against the officers.27 In response
to public pressure, however, an independent investigation of the
events surrounding McClain’s death was launched.28 In June 2020,
Colorado Governor Jared Polis appointed Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser to investigate the case and authorized him to bring
18 Aurora Police, supra note 16; accord Walker et al., supra note 16; Dakin Andone, Elijah
McClain Died After a Police Encounter Almost 1 Year Ago. Here’s What Happened Since, CNN
(Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/elijah-mcclain-died-after-a-police-encounter-almost-1-year-ago-here-s-what-happened-since/ar-BB18iPr4?li=BBorjTa [https://perma.cc/
X4AQ-VQXX].
19 See Ruiz, supra note 15. At one point during the confrontation, an officer accused McClain of attempting to reach for another officer’s gun, but “[t]he officer whose gun McClain
allegedly reached for later can be heard in the body camera footage that he did not remember
feeling McClain go for his gun.” Torres, supra note 10.
20 See Andone, supra note 18.
21 Lampen, supra note 1.
22 KUSA Staff, Man Goes into Cardiac Arrest Shortly After Struggle with Aurora Police,
9NEWS (Aug. 29, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.9news.com/article/news/crime/man-goes-into-cardiac-arrest-shortly-after-struggle-with-aurora-police/73-2730d30f-185f-4474-81e9-f65a3937b0d7
[https://perma.cc/84JH-5TWS].
23 Torres, supra note 10 (stating that Ketamine is a drug “used by medical practitioners
and veterinarians as an anesthetic,” and it was administered “with the goal of ‘rapid tranquilization in order to minimize time struggling’ ”).
24 Lampen, supra note 1.
25 See Lampen supra note 1; Tim Stelloh, Federal Authorities Reviewing Police Use of
Chokehold, Death of Elijah McClain, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2020, 9:55 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/federal-authorities-reviewing-police-use-chokehold-death-elijah-mcclain-n1232624 [https://perma.cc/DS9P-6SUD].
26 Lampen, supra note 1.
27 Id.
28 See Andone, supra note 18.

R

R

R
R
R

R

R
R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-6\GWN606.txt

1572

unknown

Seq: 5

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6-DEC-21

17:52

[Vol. 89:1568

charges if the facts were supportive.29 In his executive order, Governor Polis acknowledged the declination decision reached by Adams
County, but he stated that the McClain incident is “a tragic and complex case that warrants close attention.”30 Polis further noted the critical importance of public confidence in the criminal justice process,
and stated that this was particularly true in incidents resulting in
deaths during police-citizen encounters.31
Less than a month after the issuance of the Executive Order, Vanessa Wilson, the interim chief of the Aurora Police Department, fired
three officers, including Officer Rosenblatt who was directly involved
in the McClain incident.32 The firing was in response to photographs
taken by three Aurora Police Department officers not directly involved in the incident who were “grinning and mocking the death
of . . . McClain.”33 The photographs were taken in October 2019 near
a memorial that had been established to honor McClain.34 The photographs were sent to Rosenblatt who responded “haha” via text.35
In addition to Weiser’s investigation, pursuant to a city council
resolution in July of 2020, the city of Aurora hired Jonathan Smith—
who previously investigated Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson, Missouri—to lead a three-person team in an independent investigation of
McClain’s arrest and the actions of those involved, including both police and paramedics.36 The investigation report, which was published
on February 22, 2021, found that the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop or frisk McClain, that when Emergency Medical SerId.
Colo. Exec. Order No. D-2020-115, at 1 (June 25, 2020), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/files/inline-files/D%202020%20115—-Designating%20State%27s%20Prosecutor.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M77-5WGL].
31 See id. at 1–2.
32 Maria Cramer, 3 Officers Fired Over Photos Taken Near Elijah McClain Memorial,
N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/04/us/Elijah-McClain-aurora-policeofficers.html [https://perma.cc/967X-MFJC].
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. One of the three officers resigned shortly after the other officers were fired. Id.
36 See Esteban L. Hernandez, Attorney Leading Aurora’s Independent Elijah McClain Investigation Sees a Chance for “Genuine Conversations” About Policing, DENVERITE (Aug. 13,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://denverite.com/2020/08/13/attorney-leading-auroras-independent-elijahmcclain-sees-a-chance-for-genuine-conversations-about-policing/ [https://perma.cc/4MADKMVA]; see also Larry Buchanan, Ford Fessenden, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Haeyoun Park, Alicia
Parlapiano, Archie Tse, Tim Wallace, Derek Watkins & Karen Yourish, What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson
-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/36AA-KUCP] (discussing the death of Michael Brown, an unarmed Black teenager, who was shot and killed on August
9, 2014, by Officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri, a suburb of St. Louis).
29
30
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vices personnel administered Ketamine, it was not clear that the resistance McClain had demonstrated warranted sedation, and that the
dosage administered was based on a “grossly inaccurate and inflated
estimate” of McClain’s size.37
On September 1, 2021, Attorney General Weiser announced that
an indictment had been returned against the three Aurora Police Department officers—Officers Woodyard, Rosenblatt, and Roedema—
as well as two paramedics.38 Charges of manslaughter and criminally
negligent homicide were returned against all five defendants, and they
also now face assault offenses.39
The McClain episode epitomizes much of what is wrong with policing today. Three officers upon their arrival—with a dubious justification—immediately stopped an unarmed, young African American
male who was simply walking along a sidewalk.40 Even the 911 call
that instigated the chain of events reported little, if anything, more
than a person walking along a sidewalk wearing a mask and waving
his arms in the air.41 And even if somehow the initial stop could be
constitutionally justified, any honest evaluation of the facts could not
plausibly justify the ensuing aggression that ultimately cost this young
man his life.42 McClain’s pleas for mercy were ignored.43 There was
barely an effort to listen.44 Little, if any, meaningful attempt was made
JONATHAN SMITH, MELISSA COSTELLO & ROBERTO VILLASEÑOR, INVESTIGATION RERECOMMENDATIONS: CITY OF AURORA, COLORADO 7 (2021).
38 Jack Healy, Three Officers and Two Paramedics Are Charged in Elijah McClain’s Death,
N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/01/us/elijah-mcclain-officerscharged-colorado.html [https://perma.cc/73X7-E79V] (noting that the 32-count indictment was
returned approximately two years after McClain’s death).
39 Id.
40 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 37, at
2–3.
41 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text; Seth Cohen, Why Did They Die? Elijah
McClain and America’s Deadly Police Pandemic, FORBES (June 25, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/sethcohen/2020/06/25/elijah-mcclain-and-americas-deadly-police-pandemic/?sh=167c3bbe340f [https://perma.cc/QJL5-6PVQ] (“A 911 call reported a suspicious man
in a ski mask waving his hands, but also acknowledged the man was unarmed and had not committed a crime.”).
42 See Will Bunch, Opinion, I Can’t Stop Thinking About the Beauty of Elijah McClain,
and the Banal Evil of the Cops Who Killed Him, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 5, 2020), https://
www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/elijah-mcclain-killing-three-aurora-police-officers20200705.html [https://perma.cc/PFR2-S3R2] (asserting that the 911 caller stated that McClain
“might be a good or bad person,” “[b]ut the three officers who showed up—Nathan Woodyard,
Jason Rosenblatt, and Randy Roedema—never stopped assuming that McClain was ‘a bad person,’ ” and that the officers who ignored McClain’s pleas for mercy were “morally deaf”).
43 See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
44 See Bunch, supra note 42 (“None of McClain’s plaintive cries for mercy, nor the fact
that he was indeed unarmed, seemed to register at all with [the] three [officers] . . . .”).
37

PORT AND

R
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by the officers to ascertain what this supposedly “suspicious” person
might be up to.45 In his hands was a bag containing iced tea.46 And
when the entire ordeal ended, and McClain was loaded into an ambulance, he was limp.47
Much has been written about the culture of policing.48 It is a culture that too often encourages the flaunting of constitutional safeguards, promotes aggressive police tactics, and delegitimizes its
victims’ humanity. People of color, and particularly African Americans such as McClain, frequently bear the brunt of this reality. When
assessing the contributing causes of this culture, the U.S. Supreme
Court bears much of the responsibility.49 A steady stream of precedent that has spanned decades has communicated to police departments from coast to coast that they enjoy vast investigative authority,
45

See id.

Scott Wilson, Elijah McClain’s Death Reflects Failures of White, Suburban Police Departments, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/elijah-mcclains-death-reflects-failures-of-white-suburban-police-departments/2020/09/02/8750a726-e3e411ea-9dd2-95be2a2bef2e_story.html [https://perma.cc/3D5E-9NL2].
46

47

See Bunch, supra note 42.

See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, The Legacy of Stop and Frisk: Addressing the Vestiges
of a Violent Police Culture, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 852–60 (2014) (discussing stop and
frisk in the context of police practices in New York City); Julian A. Cook, III, Police Culture in
the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of the President’s Task Force’s Final Report, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 106 (2016) (examining President Barack Obama’s policing task force and
its recommendations for reforming police culture); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture
and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 457 (2004) (explaining that “particular
features of police culture may contribute to police brutality and its imperviousness to legal solutions,” and noting that “[i]n particular . . . the phenomenon of the ‘double message[]’ . . . allows
police higher-ups to say one thing in formal policies, while perpetuating a very different message
through on-the-ground organizational culture”); Robert W. Benson, Changing Police Culture:
The Sine Qua Non of Reform, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 681 (2001) (discussing machismo and militarism within the Los Angeles Police Department); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence:
A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479 (2016) (arguing that police
culture encourages violence against African Americans); Jeffrey Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell,
Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U. L. REV. 951, 961 (2020) (presenting empirical evidence that “Black suspects are more than twice as likely to be killed by police than are
suspects from other racial or ethnic groups”); Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior
Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611 (2016) (arguing that officer perceptions of their duties as officers must change from a “warrior” mentality to a “guardian” mindset);
Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 746 (2017)
(noting that police unions have often “stymied efforts” to reform police practices); George
Cronin & Marissa Boyers Bluestine, Police, False Confessions, and a Framework for Change in
the US, CHAMPION, June 2020, at 44, 49 (arguing that “[i]n recognition of the role of U.S. police
and their role in supporting the health and well-being of communities, efforts should begin now
to raise the level of policing to the standards of the global community by legislating changes that
move the police away from accusatorial tactics to information-gathering methods”).
48

49

See infra Section I.C.
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enormous discretion, and will often suffer little in terms of consequence when constitutional safeguards are violated.50
This Article does not attempt to address the entirety of Supreme
Court jurisprudence that has contributed to this cultural phenomenon.
Rather, this Article largely focuses on the stop and frisk context and
the limited detentions and searches justified by the Supreme Court in
the landmark Terry v. Ohio51 decision.
This Article begins by examining Terry, law enforcement’s frequent exploitation of its standards, and the adverse impact of these
practices particularly upon people of color. Thereafter, the Article
turns its attention to Utah v. Strieff,52 a case decided by the Supreme
Court only a few years ago. This Article explores in depth the hazardous and underappreciated consequences of this decision. In so doing,
it explains why Strieff encourages law enforcement to engage in suspicionless policing practices and ultimately erodes the constitutional
principles enunciated in Terry.
In this context, the Article further explores the recurrent use by
police departments of investigative practices that are designed to test
the limits of their constitutional authority. Citing examples in nonstop-and-frisk scenarios, it argues that police departments, incentivized by Strieff to disregard Terry’s reasonable suspicion thresholds,
will be inclined to engage in seizure and search practices that are more
physically aggressive.
Finally, this Article addresses the culture of policing. It discusses
how police environments shape officer behavior, how the Supreme
Court has meaningfully influenced the culture of policing in this country, and how decades of unambiguous messaging from the Court have
perpetuated the aggressive policing practices that have plagued this
country for too long.
I. TERRY V. OHIO: IMPLEMENTATION, FAILURES,

AND

EROSION

In Terry the Supreme Court enunciated the principles that govern
stop and frisk policing practices. When assessing the propriety of a
Terry stop, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a review for reasonableness.53 Specifically, police officers “must be able to
See infra Section I.C.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
53 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22. The Court reasoned, in part, that an officer’s interest in performing a Terry stop is rooted in law enforcement’s interest in crime prevention. See id. at 22
(stating that this law enforcement interest is the rationale underlying the principle that allows
50
51
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point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”54 The Court added that, when assessing the facts presented,
courts should employ an objective standard of review; namely, “would
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the
action taken was appropriate?”55
Terry also held that the Fourth Amendment authorizes “limited,”
“strictly circumscribed,” and “narrowly drawn” searches for weapons
when probable cause is not present.56 The Court stated that the issue
in such circumstances is “whether a reasonably prudent man . . . would
be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”57 The Court referenced this country’s extensive history of armed
violence and noted that annually many officers are killed and
wounded in the performance of their duties by individuals who possess firearms and weapons.58 The Court concluded that it would be
unreasonable to deny a law enforcement officer, who justifiably suspects that an individual is armed and dangerous, the authority to take
the necessary precautions to ascertain whether that person is in possession of a dangerous weapon and to neutralize a possible threat.59
Terry plainly indicates that law enforcement “hunches” do not
justify Terry stops or frisks.60 Rather, the Supreme Court set forth expolice officers, in certain circumstances, to approach individuals in order to investigate possible
criminal infractions, even when the officer lacks probable cause to effectuate an arrest).
54 Id. at 21.
55 Id. at 21–22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). “Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.” Id. at 22.
56 Id. at 25–27 (concluding that, although exigencies may justify weapons searches in the
absence of probable cause, these searches must be limited to only what is necessary to discover
weapons that may present a danger to law enforcement or the public). The Court stressed that
the inherent risks that accompany the performance of law enforcement duties necessitate a constitutionally protected mechanism that allows officers to protect themselves and the public. Id. at
23–24. The Court explained that the constitutional principle allowing for limited weapons
searches is rooted in an interest that extends beyond the government’s interest in criminal investigations. Id. at 24–25. The Court elaborated that an officer must “assure himself that the person
with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him,” suggesting that a contrary rule would subject officers to “unnecessary risks in the
performance of their duties.” Id. at 23.
57 Id. at 27.
58 See id. at 23–24.
59 See id. at 24.
60 See id. at 22, 27 (noting that when determining the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, “due weight” should not be given to “his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch’ ”).

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-6\GWN606.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 10

SUSPICIONLESS POLICING

6-DEC-21

17:52

1577

plicit objective standards that must be satisfied for such intrusions to
be constitutionally justifiable.61 History, however, has unmistakably
demonstrated that law enforcement has too often flaunted these
thresholds and that people of color have been disproportionately impacted by such excesses.
Despite these realities, Terry has its vigorous supporters. These
commentators argue, in part, that stop and frisk practices are justified
given that these practices can effectively control or deter crime,62 that
crime rates in predominately minority communities help explain disturbing racial and ethnic enforcement data,63 and that better recruitment and training of police officers can adequately address
discriminatory implementation of these principles.64 However, the
bulk of academic commentary on the stop and frisk practices that the
Court upheld in Terry has been critical.65
61 See id. at 21–27 (finding an intrusion justified when (1) an officer observes suspicious
behavior that indicates the presence of criminal activity, (2) an officer justifiably believes, based
on reasonable inference, that the individuals engaged in suspicious behavior may be armed and
pose a risk to the officer, and (3) the search is limited by the exigencies that justify the initial
intrusion).
62 See David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, Debate: The Constitutionality of Stop-andFrisk in New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 127–28 (2013) (discussing Professor
Rosenthal’s contention that stop and frisk effectively combats crime, and citing a meaningful
decline in New York City’s crime rate over an almost two decade period); Mike Callahan, 14
Things Cops Need to Know to Successfully Use ‘Stop and Frisk,’ POLICE1 (May 27, 2016), https://
www.police1.com/investigations/articles/14-things-cops-need-to-know-to-successfully-use-stopand-frisk-uJtdXSDMzhLsnWia/ [https://perma.cc/26SX-RK72] (“Bad guys interested in maiming
and killing their rivals are far less likely to carry firearms to further their illegal goals when they
know for certain that police officers are likely to stop and frisk them.”).
63 See Jesse Alejandro Cottrell, ‘Stop and Frisk’ May Be Working—But Is It Racist?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/stop-and-frisk-maybe-working-but-is-it-racist/267417/ [https://perma.cc/7TJD-PZEH] (“Supporters of Stop and
Frisk have responded to criticisms of these racial disparities by stating that the program operates
most intensely in neighborhoods with high crime rates. According to these supporters, the higher
prevalence of crime in black and Latino neighborhoods necessitates more police activity. The
disproportionate number of stops of black and Latino males, they say, has less to do with their
skin color than their location.”).
64 See Paul Larkin, Reviewing the Rationale for Stop-and-Frisk, ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/03/reviewing-the-rationale-for-stop-and-frisk/
284603/ [https://perma.cc/FG4T-2SK8] (arguing that stop and frisk is useful, not inherently discriminatory, and the oppressive impacts of the practice can be effectively addressed, in part,
through ensuring diverse police departments and proper training).
65 See, e.g., David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling
Use of Common Sense in a World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L. J. 501, 505–06 (2018)
(arguing that courts should employ empirical analysis and data to assist in their assessment of
law enforcement stop and frisk practices); Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the
Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495,
1550 (2014) (stating that New York City’s stop and frisk practice “was an inherently unconstitutional approach to crime fighting that probably ‘worked’ precisely because of the very aspects
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There is ample empirical data that supports such skepticism. Consider the well-chronicled controversies—briefly reviewed below—that
have plagued New York City over the past two decades. In Daniels v.
City of New York,66 a class action lawsuit brought in 1999, the plaintiffs argued that the New York City Police Department’s (“NYPD”)
stop and frisk practices violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and that the plaintiffs had been selectively targeted on the basis
of their race and national origin in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.67 In 2003, the parties reached
a settlement—eventually approved by a federal district court—
whereby the NYPD agreed (1) to adopt a written policy addressing
racial and national origin profiling consistent with constitutional safeguards; (2) to undergo periodic audits of the NYPD’s stop and frisk
practices with the results of these audits to be shared with plaintiffs;
and (3) to undertake training and education efforts regarding this policy.68 It was further agreed that the settlement terms would expire on
December 31, 2007.69
Citing noncompliance with the settlement terms, another action
was filed in 2008 in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices.70 In Floyd v. City of New
York,71 the plaintiffs—Black and Latino men—argued that “(1) they
were stopped without a legal basis in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) they were targeted for stops because of their race in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”72 The court ultimately
that render it unconstitutional”); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2399–400 (2017)
(noting the consequences and widescale employment of stop and frisk practices in New York
City, Philadelphia, and Chicago); Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of
Minority Communities, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 57 (2014) (arguing that “[s]top and frisk
communicates to African-American men that they are objects of disdain by the state and that
their citizenship is degraded”); Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 178–79
(2015) (arguing that stop and frisk was programmatic in implementation, which “reveals the true
costs of stop-and-frisk, because those who experience [Stop, Question, and Frisk]—primarily
young men of color—experience it as a program and not as an individual incident”).
66 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
67 Id. at 411.
68 See Historic Cases: Daniels, et. al. v. The City of New York, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Oct.
1, 2012) [hereinafter CCR Historic Cases], https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/daniels-et-al-v-city-new-york [https://perma.cc/LV5A-68D3]; see also Stipulation of Settlement at
5–14, Daniels, 198 F.R.D. 409 (No. 99 Civ. 1695).
69 See CCR Historic Cases, supra note 68.
70 See id.
71 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
72 Id. at 556.
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found the NYPD liable, concluding that the City was deliberately indifferent to their unconstitutional conduct, that they engaged in racial
profiling, and that there was overwhelming evidence of their unlawful
conduct:
Both statistical and anecdotal evidence showed that minorities are indeed treated differently than whites. For example,
once a stop is made, blacks and Hispanics are more likely to
be subjected to the use of force than whites, despite the fact
that whites are more likely to be found with weapons or contraband. I also conclude that the City’s highest officials have
turned a blind eye to the evidence that officers are conducting stops in a racially discriminatory manner. In their
zeal to defend a policy that they believe to be effective, they
have willfully ignored overwhelming proof that the policy of
targeting “the right people” is racially discriminatory and
therefore violates the United States Constitution.73
Several disturbing statistics were highlighted by the court in
reaching its conclusion. Notably, the court observed that over an
eight-year period—between January 2004 and June 2012—the NYPD
made 4.4 million stops of individuals, over 80% of whom were Black
or Hispanic.74 In 52% of these instances, a protective frisk was performed.75 Yet such frisks yielded a weapon in only 1.5% of the cases.76
The arrest rate from these occurrences was a mere 6%, with 88% “result[ing] in no further law enforcement action.”77 And when force was
employed, it was applied disproportionately against people of color.
Specifically, force was applied in 23% of the stops of Black people,
24% of stops of Hispanic people, and 17% of the stops of White
people.78
The New York experience has been well-chronicled and assessed.79 Indeed, the prevalence of stop and frisk policing, and its atId. at 562.
Id. at 556.
75 Id. at 558.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 558–59.
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., A Dialogue with Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 677 (2018)
(detailing an interview with Judge Scheindlin regarding the stop and frisk litigation that she
oversaw as a federal judge); Rudovsky & Harris, supra note 65 (discussing competing viewpoints
regarding stop and frisk practices in the context of Floyd); Bellin, supra note 65, at 1500 (analyzing an array of data and concluding that “a program of aggressive policing designed to deter
unlawful gun carrying like that employed in New York City can be either effective or constitutional, but not both”); Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v.
Ohio’s Pathway to Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508, 1508 (2017) (discussing how stop
73
74

R
R
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tendant problems has plagued police departments across the
country.80 In response, some have pondered whether stop and frisk
should be abolished altogether.81 Whatever the merits of this proposal,
it is fanciful to believe that Terry seizures and searches might someday
become a relic of the past. As the following Section of this Article
demonstrates, Terry is not going anywhere. In fact, the Supreme
Court has greased the wheels of this controversial policing practice.

and frisk practices “erod[e] the probable cause standard on which Fourth Amendment law has
historically rested, [and] the constitutionalization of stop-and-question enables police officers to
target African Americans with little to no justification”); Tracey Meares, This Land is My
Land?, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1877, 1892–93 (2017) (reviewing RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION
(2016)) (“When one reads or hears the words ‘stop and frisk’ today, one likely thinks of policing
in New York City. . . . [F]or several years between 2003 and 2011, the number of police stops of
individuals . . . increased from 160,851 in 2003 to a peak of 685,724 in 2011.”); Jeffrey Fagan &
Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 86 (2015) (commenting that—as police stops in New York City increased
sharply from less than 100,000 in 1998 to more than 685,000 in 2011—law enforcement shifted
away from articulating specific grounds to justify individual stops and instead employed “convenient and stylized narratives” or “scripts” purposefully constructed by the police and “tailored
and invoked to fit the cosmetic or epidemiological circumstances of a stop”).
80 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 65, at 2398–99 (discussing in detail the extensive employment
of stop and frisk practices in several major cities, including New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia); Josh Saul, America Has a Stop-and-Frisk Problem. Just Look at Philadelphia, NEWSWEEK
MAG. (May 18, 2016, 6:00 AM) https://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/10/stop-and-frisk-philadelphia-crisis-reform-police-460951.html [https://perma.cc/D7C3-AWH7] (discussing stop and frisk
practices in Philadelphia, as well as Newark, Cleveland, and Ferguson, among other cities).
Given the concentration of this practice in minority communities, and its regularity, Professor
Aziz Z. Huq opined that the practice “likely became the modal form of police-citizen contact for
many urban residents.” Id. at 2398. Professor Huq noted the following statistics detailing the
extent of the practice: Chicago—250,000 stops between May and August 2014 (“which translates
into 93.6 stops per 1000 inhabitants”); Philadelphia—215,000 to 253,000 people stopped per year
since 2009; Baltimore—approximately 412,000 people stopped in 2014; New York—in excess of
685,700 stops in 2011, and approximately five million stops effectuated from 2004 and 2013. Id. at
2398–99.
81 See, e.g., Daniel Bergner, Is Stop-and-Frisk Worth It?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2014), https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/04/is-stop-and-frisk-worth-it/358644/ [https://
perma.cc/93PU-DFE3] (discussing the pros and cons of stop and frisk practices); Rudy
Chinchilla, You Could Decide Whether Philly Bans Controversial Police Stop and Frisks, NBC10
PHILA. (June 12, 2020, 5:48 PM), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/you-could-decidewhether-philly-bans-controversial-police-stop-and-frisks/2431602/ [https://perma.cc/T4EAERWF] (noting that members of the Philadelphia City Council expressed their support to allow
the voting public to decide whether to amend the city’s charter to ban stop and frisk police
practices).

R
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A. Utah v. Strieff and the Undermining of the Reasonable
Suspicion Standard
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Utah v. Strieff.82 The South
Salt Lake City police received an anonymous tip stating that there was
drug activity taking place at a certain residence.83 In response, Officer
Douglas Fackrell “conducted intermittent surveillance of the home”
and observed individuals enter the residence and depart a few minutes
thereafter.84 On one occasion, Fackrell observed respondent Edward
Strieff depart the residence.85 Fackrell effectuated a stop on Strieff
and requested Strieff’s identification.86 After Strieff produced a Utah
state-issued identification card, Fackrell contacted a police dispatcher
who informed him that Strieff had an outstanding warrant for a traffic
incident.87 Fackrell, in turn, arrested Strieff, searched him incident to
his arrest, and recovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.88
Strieff was charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.89 He moved to have the evidence suppressed, arguing that it was the byproduct of his unlawful stop.90 The
government conceded that the initial stop was unlawful, but maintained that the evidence was admissible because the “warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of
the contraband.”91 The trial court accepted the government’s argument and denied the motion.92 Strieff later entered a conditional
guilty plea, reserving the right to contest the suppression issue.93
By a 5-3 margin, the Supreme Court held that the evidence seized
by Fackrell was admissible, reasoning that the arrest warrant attenuated the taint from the unlawful stop.94 The Court assessed the case
136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059.
84 Id. The Court indicated that the surveillance of the home lasted “about a week” and
that the officer observed visitors who remained in the house for a brief period. Id. These actions
alone “raise[d] his suspicion that the occupants were dealing drugs.” Id.
85 Id. at 2060.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. (noting that “Strieff conditionally pleaded guilty to reduced charges of attempted
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia”).
94 Id. at 2064. The Court granted certiorari to address divergent results rendered by the
lower courts regarding the application of the attenuating circumstances exception in situations
82
83
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pursuant to three criteria referenced in Brown v. Illinois.95 The Court
found that the first factor—“temporal proximity between the initially
unlawful stop and the search”—favored Strieff given the brief interval
between his seizure and the recovery of the evidence.96 However, the
Court determined that the last two factors—intervening circumstances
and the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s actions—favored the
state.97 According to the Court, Strieff’s outstanding arrest warrant
was an intervening circumstance that authorized Strieff’s arrest, as
well as the subsequent search of his person incident to his arrest.98
Finally, the Court found that Fackrell’s actions were neither purposeful nor flagrant.99 According to the Court, Fackrell’s actions were
where an individual has been unconstitutionally detained and a valid arrest warrant was subsequently discovered. Id. at 2060.
95 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975). Elaborating upon the three Brown factors, the Court explained that it must initially assess “temporal proximity,” meaning the time between the officer’s
unconstitutional actions and the discovery of evidence. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (quoting Brown,
422 U.S. at 603). Next, the Court addressed whether an “intervening circumstance[]” sufficiently
broke the causal connection. Id. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04) Finally, it assessed the
“purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s misconduct,” which the Court noted was “ ‘particularly’
significant.” Id. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 604).
96 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062. Regarding temporal proximity, the Court explained that its
precedents instruct that a finding of attenuation is disfavored unless “substantial time” exists
between the constitutional breach and the discovery of the evidence. Id. (quoting Kaupp v.
Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003) (per curiam)). This was not the situation in Strieff, where the
contraband recovered was obtained minutes after the officer’s unconstitutional stop. Id. Like in
Brown, where the Court suppressed statements obtained “less than two hours” after the defendant’s unconstitutional arrest, the Court found that the brief time span in Strieff “counsels in
favor of suppression.” Id. (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 604).

Id. at 2062–63.
Id. The Court reasoned that the validity of the arrest warrant, which was issued prior to
the officer’s unconstitutional detention of Strieff, was an event distinctive from the stop. Id. at
2062. Noting that “[a] warrant is a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an
arrest, and the officer has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions,” the Court stated that the
discovery of the warrant obligated the officer to arrest Strieff. Id. (quoting United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984)). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the officer’s arrest
of Strieff was “a ministerial act” that the officer was required to perform, which, in turn, justified
the officer’s subsequent search of Strieff’s person incident to his arrest. Id. at 2063.
99 Id. at 2063. Professor Orin Kerr addressed an aspect of Strieff that has been overlooked,
underappreciated, and is critical for defense attorneys to be cognizant of when defending clients
who have been unconstitutionally detained but have been criminally charged based on evidence
seized incident to their arrest on account of an outstanding arrest warrant. Orin Kerr, Opinion
Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule Is Weakened but It Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016,
9:35 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/ [https://perma.cc/8VUU-7UUW]. The Court’s assessment of the third
Brown element—the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s conduct—was partly the focus of
Kerr’s commentary. Id. Specifically, Kerr correctly observed that the Strieff majority appeared to
sidestep or glance over the government’s burden of proof with respect to this element. Id. The
Strieff majority’s approach was curious on at least two levels. First, it elevated the status of the
97
98
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three factors to a place loftier than they were in Brown. See id. (stating that Brown employed a
test akin to totality of the circumstances and did not restrict its attenuation analysis to a set of
criteria). Then, the Court proceeded with a misguided analysis of the third prong that disregards
long-standing precedent regarding burden allocation. See id. It is well established that the government bears the burden to demonstrate that warrantless stops and searches are justified. See
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (stating that it is presumptively unreasonable to
conduct a search or seizure within a home in the absence of a warrant). And it is the government’s burden to demonstrate that an exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a given situation. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (stating that the government bears the burden
to justify a warrantless entry into a house); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55
(1971) (stating that searches performed in the absence of a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and that those seeking an exemption bear the burden of showing that “the exigencies of the
situation made [a warrantless search] imperative” (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 456 (1948))). Even Brown acknowledged this basic principle. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604
(noting that “the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution”).
Thus, for attenuating circumstances to justify admissibility, it follows that the government
bears the burden with respect to each of the three Brown elements, not a select one or two.
Regarding the third element, there is scant evidence to suggest that the government met its
burden. As noted by Professor Kerr, the government presented “no evidence” regarding purpose or flagrancy, and the majority’s conclusion that the officer’s actions were nothing more than
negligent conduct that “was based on ‘good-faith mistakes,’ ” is not supported by the limited
record created by the prosecution. Kerr, supra (quoting Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063). Rather, Kerr
contends that the officer’s “generic statement” regarding his motive in seizing Strieff—namely,
to ascertain what was occurring in the residence that he recently departed—does not “meet the
government’s burden of showing good faith.” Id.
The significance of this burden allocation issue should be noted by criminal litigators, especially the defense bar, as well as judges. See Bridget Krause & Deja Vishny, Moving to Suppress
After Utah v. Strieff, CHAMPION, August 2017, at 57 (providing guidance to criminal defense
attorneys regarding motions to suppress in Strieff scenarios, and emphasizing attorney focus
upon the third Brown factor: the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s actions); Rebecca
Laitman, Fourth Amendment Flagrancy: What It Is, and What It Is Not, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
799 (2018) (discussing various judicial approaches to determining flagrancy). Given the government’s burden to justify its warrantless interventions, as well as the applicability of exceptions to
the exclusionary rule, it would be prudent for defense attorneys to press courts to hold the
government to its burdens. Thus, in Strieff scenarios, this means voicing positions (and objections, if necessary) that require the government to set forth sufficient evidence of good faith
conduct. It is not inconceivable that the government’s burden regarding this third element might
be bypassed—perhaps unintentionally—by the litigants and the courts. Professor Kerr also appears to foresee this possibility, noting that courts may “presume” good faith on the part of
government, thus obligating the defense to present evidence to the contrary. See Kerr, supra.
Giving credence to this speculation, Justice Sotomayor in her dissent made the following
observation:
The majority does not suggest what makes this case “isolated” from these and
countless other examples. Nor does it offer guidance for how a defendant can prove
that his arrest was the result of “widespread” misconduct. Surely it should not take a
federal investigation of Salt Lake County before the Court would protect someone
in Strieff’s position.
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Justice Sotomayor does not appear to be making a proclamation about burden allocation.
Her comment was more informally expressed. Of course, it is not the defendant’s burden to
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“at most negligent,”100 reasoning that the record did not support the
conclusion that the “unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”101
Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg dissented.102 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor flatly rejected the majority’s assessment of the
latter two Brown factors.103 Justice Sotomayor forcefully contended
that the discovery of the outstanding warrant was not an intervening
event and that Officer Fackrell’s actions were neither negligent nor
isolated.104 Justice Sotomayor insisted that the officer’s “sole purpose
was to fish for evidence.”105 She pressed that “[o]utstanding warrants
are surprisingly common” and implied that such awareness is prevamake this showing. Yet this casual misstatement highlights the potential for error at the district
court level. And, with Strieff as precedent, such a misallocation could prove to be consequential.
100 Streiff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063. The majority concluded that the mistakes committed by Officer Fackrell were made in good faith. Id. The Court reasoned that because the officer had no
basis to know how long Strieff had been present within the suspected drug house prior to his
departure, the officer lacked sufficient foundation “to conclude that Strieff was a short-term
visitor who may have been consummating a drug transaction.” Id. Next, the Court concluded
that the officer erred when he demanded to speak with Strieff as opposed to simply inquiring
whether the two men might engage in a conversation. Id. Noting that the officer simply sought
“to ‘find out what was going on [in] the house,’ ” the Court commented that the law did not
prohibit him from approaching Strieff and requesting a conversation. Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Appendix at 17, Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (No. 14–1373)). The Court found that this “error[] in judgment” was neither “purposeful [n]or flagrant” and did not infringe Strieff’s Fourth
Amendment protections. Id. In conclusion, the Court found that the officer’s unlawful conduct
began and ended with his unlawful stop of Strieff. Id. Everything else was permissible, including
the officer’s decision to check for the existence of outstanding warrants, which the Court characterized as “a ‘negligibly burdensome precautio[n]’ for officer safety,” and the subsequent search
of Strieff’s person, which was deemed to be a permissible search incident to his arrest. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015)).
101 Id.
102 Justices Sotomayor and Kagan wrote separate dissents. Id. at 2064–71 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 2071–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent in part, id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), and Justice Kagan’s in its entirety, id. at
2071 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 2064–69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
104 See id. at 2066–69.
105 Id. at 2067. Justice Sotomayor strongly contested the majority’s characterization of the
officer’s actions as mistakes made in good faith and as negligent. See id. at 2067–68. Even accepting this view, Justice Sotomayor argued that the exclusion remedy retains its value. See id. at
2068. She pressed:
Even officers prone to negligence can learn from courts that exclude illegally obtained evidence. Indeed, they are perhaps the most in need of the education,
whether by the judge’s opinion, the prosecutor’s future guidance, or an updated
manual on criminal procedure. If the officers are in doubt about what the law requires, exclusion gives them an “incentive to err on the side of constitutional
behavior.”
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982)).
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lent in the law enforcement community.106 Justice Sotomayor cited nationwide investigations by the Department of Justice that demonstrate
“how these astounding numbers of warrants can be used by police to
stop people without cause.”107
In their respective dissents, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan frequently warned of the consequences of the Court’s decision.108 Justice
Sotomayor stated that Strieff involved a “suspicionless stop”109 and
that the majority decision “allows the police to stop you on the street,
106

Id. at 2068. Justice Sotomayor commented:
Most striking about the Court’s opinion is its insistence that the event here was
“isolated,” with “no indication that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or
recurrent police misconduct.” Respectfully, nothing about this case is isolated.

Outstanding warrants are surprisingly common. When a person with a traffic
ticket misses a fine payment or court appearance, a court will issue a warrant.
When a person on probation drinks alcohol or breaks curfew, a court will issue a
warrant.
Id. (citation omitted). She expressed her belief that most officers perform their duties in good
faith. Id. at 2069. She stressed that this fact, however, does not alter her conclusion regarding the
commonness of the conduct at issue in Strieff. See id. Such practices, she commented, are often
“the product of institutionalized training procedures.” Id. She noted that “[t]he New York City
Police Department long trained officers to, in the words of a District Judge, ‘stop and question
first, develop reasonable suspicion later.’ ” Id. (quoting Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp.
2d 478, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). Justice Sotomayor also referenced State v. Topanotes, 76 P.3d 1159
(Utah 2003), a case decided by the Utah Supreme Court that “described as ‘“routine procedure”
or “common practice”’ the decision of Salt Lake City police officers to run warrant checks on
pedestrians they detained without reasonable suspicion.” Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (quoting Topanotes, 76 P.3d at 1160).
107 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor cited Justice
Department statistics that illuminate the “astounding numbers of warrants” across the country
and how they can be employed by the police to detain people without suspicion. Id. She noted
that in New Orleans, officers in a single year effectuated approximately 60,000 arrests, “of which
about 20,000 were of people with outstanding traffic or misdemeanor warrants from neighboring
parishes for such infractions as unpaid tickets.” Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 29 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NKE-8VTC]). She
also stated that in the greater St. Louis metropolitan area, residents were “routinely” stopped by
law enforcement “for no reason other than ‘an officer’s desire to check whether the subject had
a municipal arrest warrant pending.’ ” Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 11, 17 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AV4J-YUVR]). Justice Sotomayor also referenced Newark, New Jersey, where
in a four-year span 52,235 individuals were stopped by law enforcement, and 39,308 of them
were checked for outstanding warrants. Id. She stated that a Justice Department review determined that “approximately 93% of the stops would have been considered unsupported by articulated reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 2069 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION
OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 n.7 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
crt/legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findings_7-22-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/76AA-3THA]).
108 Id. at 2064–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Id. at 2071–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong.”110 Justice Sotomayor
forecasted that Strieff would discourage officer compliance with
Fourth Amendment safeguards, explaining that a rule that restricts
the admissibility of evidence to that which is lawfully obtained encourages law enforcement entities to respect Fourth Amendment
safeguards.111
Echoing Justice Sotomayor’s sentiments, Justice Kagan commented that the central purpose underlying the exclusionary rule is to
deter unconstitutional police conduct.112 Justice Kagan argued that the
Strieff majority undercuts this objective, and encourages the unconstitutional conduct undertaken by Fackrell.113 She explained that officers
who lack sufficient justification to seize an individual are now incentivized to disregard constitutional safeguards and effectuate a stop,
given their awareness of the commonality of outstanding arrest warrants and the admissibility of evidence recovered from such individuals.114 Justice Kagan added that an officer who is cognizant that such
evidence would be inadmissible would be less likely to engage in such
practices.115
Many are skeptical of the correlation between evidence exclusion
and police behavior.116 Nevertheless, the perspectives of Justices

110 Id. at 2064. Justice Sotomayor cautioned not to “be soothed by the [majority] opinion’s
technical language.” Id. She added that, pursuant to Strieff, the government could admit evidence at trial that was recovered subsequent to an unconstitutional detention if the officer
learned that the detainee had an outstanding warrant for failure to pay a fine prior to the search
but after the illegal stop. Id.
111

See id. at 2065–66.

Id. at 2071 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the exclusionary rule disincentivizes law
enforcement from disregarding Fourth Amendment safeguards).
112

113

Id. at 2073.

114

Id. at 2071.

115

Id. at 2071–72.

See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999
U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 442 (1999) (vigorously disputing that the exclusionary rule deters unconstitutional police behavior, arguing that the “rule has become a venerated symbol of the liberal
agenda,” that the rule “is a fraud,” and that “[i]t is not an effective way of preventing police
misconduct, nor is it mandated by the Constitution except in a narrow subset of cases”); Tonja
Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 603,
610 (2011) (contending that the incentives underlying the exclusionary rule and law enforcement
behavior are not congruous, and arguing, in part, that supervisors have comparatively greater
influence over daily officer behavior); Yale Kamisar, The Writings of John Barker Waite and
Thomas Davies on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1821 (2002)
(discussing various arguments against the exclusionary penalty).
116
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Sotomayor and Kagan—to which I also subscribe117—are reflective of
what I suspect are the views of most academics.118 But it may also be
instructive to consider this question from a different vantage point:
namely, whether or not Strieff actually encourages officers to respect
constitutional safeguards. To this, I suspect that even the most ardent
critics of the exclusionary rule would be hard pressed to make a claim
that is objectively persuasive.
It is simply preposterous to suggest that Strieff—a case that provides law enforcement with a pathway to evade a constitutional responsibility—somehow fosters officer compliance with that very
obligation. Thus, the rosiest characterization of Strieff is that it is
somehow incentive-neutral, i.e., that it neither incentivizes officers to
violate nor comply with constitutional safeguards. However, even this
generous characterization is strained, counterintuitive, and divorced
from the reality of policing practices in this country. The following
Section avoids such mental gymnastics; instead, it examines the true
and unfortunate impacts of Strieff and its real-life ramifications.
B. Utah v. Strieff and Its Lasting Ramifications
The views expressed by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan capture
Strieff’s most crucial, central truth: it disincentivizes constitutional
compliance.119 Justice Sotomayor, writing only for herself, explained
in notable—and at times vivid—detail how people of color, in particular, will bear the impact of Strieff.120 But she also emphasized that the
ramifications will be felt by all Americans.121 Justice Sotomayor stated
that Strieff communicates to “everyone, white and black, guilty and
innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time,” and
117 See Julian A. Cook, III, The Wrong Decision at the Wrong Time: Utah v. Strieff in the
Era of Aggressive Policing, 70 SMU L. REV. 293 (2017).
118 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It
Be?, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 348 (2013) (noting that all but one of the academic participants
at an exclusionary rule symposium share a perspective that the rule should be retained); Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 525, 525 (2013) (commenting that there is “widespread support” for the contention that
evidence exclusion “offers some meaningful deterrence of unreasonable search and seizure because of the political costs of exclusion”).
119 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Id. at 2071–74
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The white defendant in this case shows that
anyone’s dignity can be violated in this manner. But it is no secret that people of color are
disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny.” (citation omitted)).
121

See id.
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“that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation
of your rights.”122
The implications of Strieff are quite pronounced and extend beyond the well-reasoned points presented in its dissents.123 In Terry, the
Court declared that “[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”124 In this statement, Terry identified two methods by which a seizure could take
place: first, when an officer exerts physical force, and second, through
a demonstration of authority.125 In California v. Hodari D.,126 the Supreme Court elaborated upon this definition.127 The Court held that a
seizure occurs when the officer either makes a showing of authority to
which the suspect submits128 or physically touches a suspect with an
intent to seize.129 Whether a seizure has occurred is assessed pursuant
to an objective standard.130
Justice Sotomayor is correct that Strieff encourages suspicionless
policing practices.131 More plainly—and vividly—Strieff incentivizes
physical confrontation and physical contact by the police with individuals whom they have no constitutionally justifiable basis to physically
confront and touch. In this day of heightened distrust between the
police and the largely minority communities that they often serve,
Id.
For an additional academic perspective on Strieff, see Guy Padula, Utah v. Strieff: Lemonade Stands and Dragnet Policing, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 469, 474–75 (2017), which recounts how
law enforcement strategies that invoke racial profiling are intentional and the ways that Fourth
Amendment protections have been “eviscerated.” See also Emily J. Sack, Illegal Stops and the
Exclusionary Rule: The Consequences of Utah v. Strieff, 22 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 263,
286 (2017), which argues that “the routine stops and warrant checks that happen all over this
country multiple times each day[] make[] [the holding in Strieff] particularly significant.” For a
critique of Strieff’s majority opinion for its misplaced societal priorities, see Case Comment,
Utah v. Strieff, 130 HARV. L. REV. 337 (2016).
124 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
125 See id.
126 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
127 See id. at 626–28; see also Thomas K. Clancy, Dir., Nat’l Ctr. for Just. & the Rule of L.,
Presentation to Montana Courts of Limited Jurisdiction: Structure of Search and Seizure Analysis (Apr. 28, 2009) (providing overview of Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles).
128 See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 (“It does not remotely apply, however, to the prospect of
a policeman yelling ‘Stop, in the name of the law!’ at a fleeing form that continues to flee. That is
no seizure. . . . An arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to
the assertion of authority.”).
129 See id. (“The word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.”).
130 See id. at 627–28 (noting precedent that provides that a seizure occurs when all of the
circumstances suggest to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave).
131 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
122
123
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Strieff thus ups the ante for constitutionally unjustifiable police-instigated physical confrontations.132
Strieff is thus far more consequential than a case about a policecitizen encounter where an exclusionary remedy was not imposed.
Strieff’s lasting impact, in fact, has little to do with its contribution to
the landscape of the attenuating circumstances doctrine. Rather,
Strieff’s legacy is to effectively water down Terry’s constitutional
threshold for Fourth Amendment detentions. The Court did not expressly say so, but the incentive-laden Strieff decision undermines the
explicit constitutional prerequisites delineated in Terry for the
seizures of individuals. Terry’s reasonable suspicion mandates have
been in existence since 1968, and police departments, including those
guilty of systematically violating its standards, are, and have been,
fully cognizant of the case’s thresholds. Strieff, however, relaxes these
constitutional mandates, unmistakably communicating to the police
that further flaunting of Terry will be tolerated and encouraged. Fully
cognizant of the prevalence of outstanding warrants, law enforcement
officers across the country have little incentive not to take advantage
of the enhanced investigative freedoms afforded them by Strieff.
I expressed thoughts that are instructive to this dilemma in an
essay I published in the Notre Dame Law Review Online. In that
piece, I assessed recommendations proffered by a task force established by President Barack Obama designed to improve policing practices and improve community relationships.133 I argued that the array
of reform proposals set forth by the task force were “laudable objectives” and “are reasoned approaches to the issue of police malfeasance.”134 But I cautioned that the well-intentioned proposals were
destined for failure given counter-influences emanating from the Supreme Court.135 In particular, I referenced the Supreme Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence which has been persistently undercut in the
post-Warren Court era.136 With such messaging, I argued that even
132 See Krause & Vishny, supra note 99, at 57 (discussing that the police in Ferguson, Missouri, a city of approximately 21,000 residents, obtained almost 33,000 arrest warrants—primarily for driving infractions—in 2013, issued tickets to the majority of the community to raise
revenue, and had “16,000 open arrest warrants” in 2015, which reveals, “[u]nder the rationale of
Strieff, virtually the entire population of the city could be arrested and searched at any time”);
Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and Race, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1543, 1588 (2019) (expressing disbelief that the majority in Strieff failed to mention the
subject of race when it issued its decision).
133 Cook, supra note 48, at 107.
134 Id. at 109.
135 See id. at 109–13.
136 Id.

R

R
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well-intentioned police departments will find it difficult to implement
and sustain meaningful positive reforms absent legislative or judicial
mandates that require strategic change.137 Police departments are cognizant of their investigative authorities and absent such mandates they
are not going to voluntarily relinquish such powers.138
When the Supreme Court issues decisions that impact law enforcement, police departments listen. And when the Court’s pronouncements enhance law enforcement’s investigative authorities,
officers will often press the outer limits of their newly granted authorities. Consider, for example, police officer behavior in the context of
automobile searches incident to an arrest. In New York v. Belton,139
the Supreme Court upheld a search of a jacket in the passenger compartment of an automobile as a valid search incident to arrest.140 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized the dual rationales underlying such searches enunciated in Chimel v. California:141 (1) the
ability of the suspect to retrieve evidence and (2) officer safety
searches.142 Yet the Court recognized the difficulty of developing a
“workable” application of the Chimel principles in the context of automobile searches subsequent to an arrest.143 The Court commented
that items within the passenger compartment of an automobile are
“generally” within reach of an arrestee, but added that such scenarios
are not “inevitabl[e].”144 In the end, the Court announced what it
termed a “workable rule”; namely, “when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
137 Id. at 111–12. The recommendations set forth by the task force (e.g., embracing a guardian mindset, or increasing law enforcement policy and practice transparency) are worthy objectives, but are ultimately hamstrung by the lack of incentives on the part of law enforcement to
adopt and maintain such reforms. See id.
138 Id. at 112.
139 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
140 Id. at 460. Belton involved a vehicular stop for speeding. Id. at 455. During the course of
the stop, the officer “smelled burnt marihuana” and observed an envelope within the vehicle
marked “Supergold.” Id. at 455–56. The occupants of the vehicle were arrested, and a search of
the vehicle incident to an arrest uncovered a jacket that belonged to Belton and contained cocaine. Id. at 456. The Court held that after a custodial arrest of an automobile occupant, an
officer may perform a contemporaneous search of the automobile’s passenger compartment and
examine the contents of containers found therein. Id. at 462–63.
141 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
142 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (holding that incident to an arrest
officers may search the immediate grab area of the arrestee).
143 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
144 Id. (“[A]rticles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of
an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763)).
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contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”145
In his dissent, Justice Brennan seemed to interpret the majority
opinion as creating a bright-line rule allowing a passenger compartment search irrespective of the presence of either Chimel rationale.146
But Justice Brennan’s interpretation was not universally held, as evidenced by the circuit split on the issue.147 However, his view was the
predominant perspective and, as a result, Belton was commonly understood by officers and the courts as creating a bright-line constitutional principle.148 Yet as stated by the Court in Arizona v. Gant,149 the
predominant interpretation of Belton “untether[s] the rule from the
justifications underlying the Chimel exception—a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it ‘in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic
scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.’”150
Admittedly, ambiguities attended the Belton decision. Even Gant
was decided by a 5-4 majority.151 What is unambiguous, however, is
the police behavior in the aftermath of Belton. Vehicular passenger
compartment searches, even in the absence of the Chimel dangers,
were commonplace in the years between Belton and Gant.152 Police
Id. (footnote omitted).
See id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the Court today disregards
these principles, and instead adopts a fiction—that the interior of a car is always within the
immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car”).
147 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342 n.2 (2009) (citing various circuit court cases
reaching divergent conclusions).
148 See id. at 342.
149 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
150 Id. at 343 (emphasis added) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3). In Gant, the Court
circumscribed the instances when vehicular searches incident to arrest were permissible. Id. at
351. It held that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it
is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id.
151 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Souter, and Ginsburg. Justices Alito, Roberts, Breyer, and Kennedy dissented.
152 See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (explaining that examples “are legion”). Gant involved the stop of a vehicle on
account of Gant driving on a suspended license. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335. Gant was arrested and
secured in the back of a police car. Id. at 336. Thereafter, officers searched Gant’s car and discovered cocaine. Id. Referencing the dual rationales underlying the holding in Chimel, the Court
found that the search of Gant’s vehicle was not authorized given that Gant was secured at the
time of the search and was unable to access items within his vehicle. Id. at 344. The Court held
that Chimel authorizes a search in instances where the arrestee is unsecured and has access to
the vehicle’s interior, and when there is a reasonable probability that evidence pertinent to the
offense of arrest can be found inside the vehicle. Id. at 342–43.
145
146
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restraint was seemingly not the norm. In Thornton v. United States,153
the Court upheld a search of a vehicle incident to arrest despite the
fact that the defendant was secured in a police vehicle.154 Justice Scalia
commented in his concurrence that “[t]he popularity of the practice is
not hard to fathom,” and asked rhetorically “[i]f Belton entitles an officer to search a vehicle upon arresting the driver despite having taken
measures that eliminate any [Chimel] danger[s], what rational officer
would not take [advantage of] those measures?”155 He also described
the number of instances involving “this precise factual scenario” as
“legion”156 and “frequently recurring.”157 The majority in Gant stated
that in the almost three decades since Belton “rarely” are items within
the interior of a vehicle within the reach of the arrestee.158 And in her
concurrence in Thornton, Justice O’Connor stated that the vehicular
searches upheld by the lower courts in the name of Belton amounted
to police entitlements.159
Consider also law enforcement conduct in the context of Miranda
warnings. In Missouri v. Seibert,160 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a police department practice in Rolla, Missouri
whereby officers would purposefully interrogate an individual in violation of Miranda and obtain a confession, then provide Miranda
warnings and interrogate the individual a second time in anticipation
that the person would repeat the incriminating statements.161 The case
centered around the death of a child whose mother—Patrice Seibert—had been arrested in connection with the child’s death and was
being interrogated by the police.162 After her arrest, Seibert was transported to a police station and questioned by an officer without Miranda warnings.163 After confessing to the killing of her son, she was
541 U.S. 615 (2004).
Id. at 622–24. Moments after exiting his car, Thornton was approached by an officer
who inquired about an issue involving the vehicle’s license tags. Id. at 618. During the encounter,
Thornton reached into his pockets and produced some illegal narcotics. Id. He was then placed
under arrest and secured inside the police vehicle. Id. The officer then searched Thornton’s
vehicle incident to the arrest and uncovered a handgun under the driver’s seat. Id.
155 See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
156 Id. Scalia also noted that the United States admitted to the prevalence of the police
practice of securing an arrestee in a police vehicle prior to performing a search of the passenger
compartment. Id.
157 Id. at 626.
158 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009).
159 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
160 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
161 See id. at 604–05, 609–10.
162 Id. at 604–05.
163 Id.
153
154
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given a twenty-minute break before being provided with Miranda
warnings for the first time.164 She then reiterated her confession.165
The procedure followed by the officer in Seibert was not impromptu.166 Rather, it was an established police protocol, one that was
“promoted not only by his own department, but by a national police
training organization and other departments in which he had
worked.”167 The Court noted the “popularity” of the practice and
cited cases across several districts where this “question-first” strategy
had been employed.168 Notably, the State of Missouri argued before
the Supreme Court that the interrogation protocol was authorized
pursuant to Oregon v. Elstad,169 a case decided by the Court almost
two decades earlier. In Elstad, officers arrived at the residence of an
eighteen-year-old male, Michael Elstad, who was a suspect in a recent
burglary.170 After placing him under arrest in his home, police questioned Elstad regarding the burglary, and Elstad made some incriminating remarks.171 Shortly thereafter, the police transported Elstad to
Id. at 604–05. The Court described the interrogation in the following manner:
[T]he police awakened Seibert at 3 a.m. at a hospital where Darian was being
treated for burns. In arresting her, Officer Kevin Clinton followed instructions from
Rolla, Missouri, Officer Richard Hanrahan that he refrain from giving Miranda
warnings. After Seibert had been taken to the police station and left alone in an
interview room for 15 to 20 minutes, Officer Hanrahan questioned her without
Miranda warnings for 30 to 40 minutes, squeezing her arm and repeating “Donald
was also to die in his sleep.” After Seibert finally admitted she knew Donald was
meant to die in the fire, she was given a 20–minute coffee and cigarette break.
Officer Hanrahan then turned on a tape recorder, gave Seibert the Miranda warnings, and obtained a signed waiver of rights from her. He resumed the questioning
with “Ok, ‘trice, we’ve been talking for a little while about what happened on
Wednesday the twelfth, haven’t we?” and confronted her with her prewarning
statements . . . .
Id. at 604–05 (citations omitted).
165 Id. at 605.
166 See id. at 609.
167 Id. at 609.
168 Id. at 611 & n.3 (citing cases from the Ninth, Eighth, and First Circuits as well as the
D.C. Court of Appeals).
169 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
170 See id. at 300 (noting that artwork totaling $150,000 was stolen from a home in Salem,
Oregon).
171 Id. at 300–01. The Court stated that two police officers went to Elstad’s residence with a
warrant for his arrest. Id. at 300. When the officers arrived, Elstad’s mother answered the door
and took the officers to her son’s room. Id. After getting dressed, Elstad accompanied the officers to the living room. Id. While one of the officers was with Elstad’s mother in the kitchen,
the second officer was with Elstad in the living room. Id. at 300–01. Regarding the living room
conversation, the officer testified to the following exchange with Elstad:
I sat down with Mr. Elstad and I asked him if he was aware of why Detective
McAllister and myself were there to talk with him. He stated no, he had no idea
164

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\89-6\GWN606.txt

1594

unknown

Seq: 27

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

6-DEC-21

17:52

[Vol. 89:1568

the police station.172 About an hour later, police provided Elstad a
Miranda warning, and he confessed to the crime.173
The Court declined to suppress the post-Miranda statements.174
The Court held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned
yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his
rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda
warnings.”175 The Court reasoned that an individual such as Elstad,
who is deprived of his Miranda warnings, is still capable of later waiving his Miranda rights and providing a voluntary confession.176
In Siebert, however, the Court rejected the government’s similar
argument, concluding that this practice was unconstitutional.177 For
purposes of this Article, what is particularly notable is the State’s apparent reliance upon Elstad and the case’s arguable factual similarity
to that in Siebert.178 As in Elstad, the practice at issue in Siebert involved interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings, followed by
a confession, followed by the provision of the requisite warnings that
why we were there. I then asked him if he knew a person by the name of Gross, and
he said yes, he did, and also added that he heard that there was a robbery at the
Gross house. And at that point I told Mr. Elstad that I felt he was involved in that,
and he looked at me and stated, “Yes, I was there.”
Id. at 301 (quoting Appendix at 19–20, Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (No. 83-773)).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See id. at 312.
175 Id. at 318.
176 See id. at 317–18. The Court recognized that custodial statements obtained in violation
of Miranda are excludable at trial in the State’s case-in-chief. Id. at 317. The Court emphasized
that it was adhering to that principle and that an officer’s “good faith” does not excuse an officer’s duty to comply with this principle. Id. But the Court declared that it should not be presumed that a second inculpatory statement is necessarily tainted by the initial statement that was
obtained in violation of Miranda. Id. at 317–18. The Court explained that a second statement can
be found to be voluntarily provided and thus admissible at trial because as the Court stated:
[T]here is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect’s initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary. The
relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.
As in any such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak
after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative. We find that the
dictates of Miranda and the goals of the Fifth Amendment proscription against use
of compelled testimony are fully satisfied in the circumstances of this case by barring use of the unwarned statement in the case in chief. No further purpose is
served by imputing “taint” to subsequent statements obtained pursuant to a voluntary and knowing waiver.
Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
177 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004).
178 See id. at 614–15.
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produced a second confession. Justice Souter commented on the prevalence of the interrogation practice:
[T]he reason that question-first is catching on is as obvious as
its manifest purpose, which is to get a confession the suspect
would not make if he understood his rights at the outset; the
sensible underlying assumption is that with one confession in
hand before the warnings, the interrogator can count on getting its duplicate, with trifling additional trouble.179
As noted, the interrogation methodology employed by the Rolla
Police Department was the byproduct of a national training institute
and practices employed by other law enforcement entities.180 Justice
Souter observed that the Police Law Institute’s Illinois Police Law
Manual instructed that the two-step interrogation methodology was
permissible.181 Specifically, the manual provided, “[a]t any point during the pre-Miranda interrogation, usually after arrestees have confessed, officers may then read the Miranda warnings and ask for a
waiver. If the arrestees waive their Miranda rights, officers will be able
to repeat any subsequent incriminating statements later in court.”182
Thus, the two-step approach was designed with a specific purpose: to
successfully obtain confessions while minimizing the impact of Miranda warnings.183
The above-described Belton and Miranda histories are informative with respect to law enforcement investigative practices and tendencies. In each instance, law enforcement entities, cognizant of
Supreme Court precedent, tested the outer limits of their constitutional authorizations. Police officers sought maximum investigative
advantage in each instance and developed and implemented strategies
designed to achieve those objectives. The same investigative approach
was and continues to be undertaken in the context of Terry stops and
179 Id. at 613. The Court did not have information indicating the extent of the practice but
noted that the interrogation methodology was employed by other police departments as well. Id.
at 609.
180 See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
181 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 610–11.
182 Id. (quoting POLICE L. INST., ILLINOIS POLICE LAW MANUAL 83 (Jan. 2001–Dec. 2003)).
183 See Locke Houston, Comment, Miranda-in-the-Middle: Why Justice Kennedy’s Subjective Intent of the Officer Test in Missouri v. Seibert Is Binding and Good Public Policy, 82 MISS.
L.J. 1129, 1131 (2013) (“In Seibert, police officials found the loophole that the Elstad decision
left behind, and officers nationwide developed procedural protocol that adopted manipulative
strategies that deliberately violated the Miranda requirement.”); Kyron Huigens, Custodial
Compulsion, 99 B.U. L. REV. 523, 578 (2019) (“Elstad’s rule encouraged police to take an unlawful and inadmissible confession purposely in order to cause the suspect to lower his guard and
give a second, lawful, and admissible confession.”).

R
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frisks. In Terry, the Court announced a new law enforcement prerogative that authorized the temporary detention and frisking of individuals based upon the satisfaction of a reasonable suspicion threshold.184
Satisfaction of these standards, the Court reasoned, complied with the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement.185 But far too often
police departments have tested and exceeded these boundaries. Fully
cognizant of Terry’s long-standing constitutional mandates, individual
officers and law enforcement departments have disregarded these limitations with disturbing frequency.186
In the midst of this disturbing history, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Strieff. That decision—which effectively dispensed with Terry standards altogether in the context of outstanding
warrants187—will do nothing to halt or even mitigate the Terry abuses
and will almost certainly exacerbate the problem.188 It is fanciful to
believe that law enforcement entities that flaunted Terry’s explicit
constitutional standards with glaring frequency will forgo the opportunity to engage in the same conduct when the Supreme Court has
granted a constitutional pass to do so. Many law enforcement departments have acted to implement positive reforms and should be commended for their efforts.189 But it will be exceedingly difficult to
184

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968).

185

Id. at 20–31.

See, e.g., Emily Badger, The Lasting Effects of Stop-and-Frisk in Bloomberg’s New
York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/upshot/stop-and-friskbloomberg.html [https://perma.cc/M8SU-3G3S] (describing stop and frisk practices in New York
City, stating that the practice infrequently led to arrests or the recovery of weapons, and explaining that Black and Hispanic individuals were disproportionately impacted by the practice);
Ashley Southall & Michael Gold, Why ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Inflamed Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/nyregion/bloombergstop-and-frisk-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/N4QE-Z6VV] (noting that in New York City
there were 685,724 stops in 2011, and that during Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s three terms, the
police recorded 5,081,689 stops); Associated Press, Milwaukee to Pay $3.4 Million to Settle ‘Stopand-Frisk’ Lawsuit, NBC NEWS (July 10, 2018, 5:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/milwaukee-pay-3-4-million-settle-stop-frisk-lawsuit-n890351 [https://perma.cc/5UDBSKPB] (noting that Milwaukee police officers made in excess of “350,000 traffic and pedestrian
stops from 2010 to 2017 for which they have no record explaining probable cause for the interaction”); CPD Agrees to ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Reforms, Avoids ACLU Lawsuit, ABC 7 CHI. (Aug. 7,
2015), https://abc7chicago.com/chicago-police-cpd-stop-and-frisk-stop-and-frisk/909740/ [https://
perma.cc/7XNR-NAXR] (stating that during an approximate four-month period in 2014, Chicago police officers made over 250,000 stops that did not culminate in an arrest, and that almost
seventy-five percent of the detainees were Black).
186

187

See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).

188

See id. at 2065–66 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Id. at 2073–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

See David Leonhardt, Where Police Reform Has Worked, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/briefing/george-floyd-buffalo-coronavirus-your-friday-brief189
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maintain positive reforms when Supreme Court precedent strongly
encourages officers to disregard constitutional safeguards.190
With full awareness of Strieff and its relaxation of Terry’s reasonable suspicion standards, no one should be surprised by an uptick in
seizures in the absence of any suspicion. And when coupled with an
awareness of the plethora of outstanding warrants,191 officers and police departments fully comprehend the risks and rewards attendant to
engaging in such practices.192 Whether acting individually or as part of
a collective entity spurred by culture and/or protocol, the investigative
rewards are too great and the individual and departmental costs are
too few to culminate in an improved policing environment.

ing.html [https://perma.cc/5WBV-R92H] (discussing positive reforms in police departments in
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Baltimore, Chicago, Phoenix, and Philadelphia).
190 See Cook, supra note 48, at 111–12 (“[G]oodwill alone will produce little measurable
benefit unless accompanied by legislative or judicial mandates that penalize police misdeeds. The
police are not going to relinquish investigative authority granted by the Supreme Court through
voluntary election.”). For a discussion of the positive impact that judicial oversight has upon law
enforcement stop and frisk practices, see Becca James, Stop and Frisk in 4 Cities: The Importance
of Open Police Data, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Mar. 3, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/03/02/stop-and-frisk-in-4-cities-the-importance-of-open-police-data-2/ [https://
perma.cc/XH8H-RYKV]. In New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, for instance, “courtmandated data collection and review helped hold police departments accountable for officer
actions and ultimately reduced unlawful stop and frisk practices.” Id. But “with the absence of
an external body mandating the collection of this data, the priority for data collection can fall by
the wayside.” Id.

R

191 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068–69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The States and Federal
Government maintain databases with over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast majority of
which appear to be for minor offenses. Even these sources may not track the ‘staggering’ numbers of warrants, ‘drawers and drawers’ full, that many cities issue for traffic violations and ordinance infractions.” (citation omitted) (quoting DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 47, 55 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/
press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AV4J-YUVR])); see also Katherine A. Macfarlane, Predicting Utah v. Streiff’s Civil Rights Impact, 126 YALE L.J.F. 139, 147 (2016) (predicting that Strieff “will likely result in numerous
suspicionless stops made solely to run warrant checks”).
192 See Gene Demby, An Immune System, NPR: CODE SWITCH (July 8, 2020 12:06 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/12/876212065/an-immune-system [https://perma.cc/8X76-QKMG]
(discussing qualified immunity and police department resistance to reform); Jaime Ehrlich, The
Question Before the Supreme Court Is Who Polices the Police, CNN (June 3, 2020, 5:12 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/politics/supreme-court-qualified-immunity-police-accountability-george-floyd/index.html [https://perma.cc/B8B3-WMZ2] (noting Professor Joanna Schwartz’s
view that qualified immunity signals to law enforcement that they will not suffer consequences
when they violate the constitution); see also Macfarlane, supra note 191, at 147 (noting that stops
motivated by officer interest in performing a warrant check are “common,” that people of color
are disproportionately impacted by this practice, and that victims will be without meaningful
civil or criminal remedies).

R
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C. Police Culture, People of Color, and the Erosion of Terry
The lessons from this nation’s experience with stop and frisk
demonstrate that people of color will be most disadvantaged by
Strieff’s loosening of Terry’s constitutional safeguards.193 Arguably,
Strieff generated more attention in the media and elsewhere for Justice Sotomayor’s dissent than for its majority decision.194 Justice
Sotomayor not only engaged in an extensive legal critique of the majority’s assessment of the three criteria delineated in Brown,195 but she
also got deeply personal.196 She delved at length into the implications
of Strieff for people of color.197
On the one hand, when narrowly constricted to its factual four
corners, Strieff was a case that had nothing to do with race or ethnicity. Strieff, a White male, made no allegation that his race or ethnicity
contributed to the officer’s decision to seize his person.198 The majority opinion in Strieff is similarly devoid of any reference to race or

193 See, e.g., Southall & Gold, supra note 186 (reporting that Black and Hispanic New
Yorkers were more likely to be stopped and frisked despite the fact that White New Yorkers
“were twice as likely to be found with a gun,” and that in 2009 Black and Hispanic New Yorkers
were nine times more likely to be stopped than White New Yorkers); Jeffery Robinson, ACLU:
‘Stop and Frisk’ Creates Endless Cycle of Violence, TIME (Sept. 23, 2016, 9:58 AM), https://
time.com/4504985/aclu-donald-trump-stop-and-frisk/ [https://perma.cc/8Q92-2J5J] (noting that
the American Civil Liberties Union has found racial disparities in stop and frisk practices in New
York, Newark, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia).

R

194 See Robert Barnes, Sotomayor’s Fierce Dissent Slams High Court’s Ruling on Evidence
from Illegal Stops, WASH. POST (June 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/supreme-court-rules-5-3-that-mistakes-by-officer-dont-undermine-conviction/2016/
06/20/f1f7d0d2-36f9-11e6-8f7c-d4c723a2becb_story.html [https://perma.cc/B2CE-VEP4] (stating
that “the low-profile case more likely will be remembered for a fierce and personal dissent from
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who said the decision would exacerbate illegal stops of minorities”);
Matt Ford, Justice Sotomayor’s Ringing Dissent, ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016) https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/ [https://perma.cc/
QL9Y-E55R] (recognizing Justice Sotomayor’s “thundering dissent,” and commenting that it
was “extraordinary for its breadth and intensity”); Ronald Tyler, Utah v. Strieff: A Bad Decision
on Policing with a Gripping Dissent by Justice Sotomayor, STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (July 5, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/07/05/utah-v-strieff-a-bad-decision-on-policing-with-a-gripping-dissent-by-justice-sotomayor/ [https://perma.cc/T37A-FGK5] (noting Justice
Sotomayor’s “powerful dissent,” and adding that she “conducts a suitably careful and intelligent
analysis, but does so in a voice that speaks not only to the legally trained, but also to the ordinary
people who are most impacted by the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence”).
195 See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064–69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 95–97
and accompanying text.
196

See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

197

Id.

198

See id. at 2070.

R
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ethnicity.199 Yet, as Justice Sotomayor correctly observes, Strieff had
everything to do with race and ethnicity.
The policing of people of color is at the heart of the Strieff decision. Strieff—a case involving a suspicionless stop in violation of
Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard—simply cannot be divorced
from the broader historical and present-day context of racial injustice
in which it was decided.200 In this vein, Justice Sotomayor also interjected her thoughts indirectly about the culture of policing and the
Court’s influence upon it.201 She commented that the Court’s precedents have empowered law enforcement with substantial authority to
“probe and examine” individuals, and that the Court’s forgiveness of
officer missteps only incentivizes a repeat of such constitutional infractions.202 Such grants of broad investigative powers, Justice
Sotomayor stressed, encourage arbitrary and demeaning law enforcement practices.203
Since the close of the Warren Court, there has been a steady
stream of Supreme Court jurisprudence that has enhanced law enforcement’s investigative authority, reinforced these principles, and
communicated to the police that the Court will forgive police officers’
constitutional missteps along the way.204 Consider, for example, the
Court’s jurisprudence regarding what constitutes a seizure within the
199 See Yankah, supra note 132, at 1588, 1594 (noting that amidst the Black Lives Matter
movement, which advocates for police reform and a national conversation about race and policing, the majority opinion in Strieff avoided the subject altogether).
200

See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2065, 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

201

See id. at 2065–69.

Id. at 2069 (“I would add that unlawful ‘stops’ have severe consequences much greater
than the inconvenience suggested by the name. This Court has given officers an array of instruments to probe and examine you. When we condone officers’ use of these devices without adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an arbitrary manner. We also risk
treating members of our communities as second-class citizens.”).
202

203 Id.; see also Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of
Criminal Justice Reform, 2019 FREEDOM CTR. J. 75, 82 (arguing, in part, that Supreme Court
jurisprudence has promoted racially unjust police practices).
204 Professor Devon Carbado draws a linkage between the Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and aggressive police practices against people of color. Devon W. Carbado, From
Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 128–29 (2017). He argues that the Court’s precedent “effectively
‘pushes’ police officers to target African Americans and ‘pulls’ African Americans into contact
with the police.” Id. at 129. Professor Allegra McLeod seemingly concurs: commenting about
“the Supreme Court’s complicity in police violence,” Professor McLeod writes that the “Court’s
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine sanctions much of the policing activity” that has led to
the deaths of several African American victims. Allegra M. McLeod, Police Violence, Constitutional Complicity, and Another Vantage, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 157, 159, 161.
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Royer205 and Florida v.
Bostick206 are instructive. In Royer, the Court held that an officer does
not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment by simply approaching an
individual in a public space, identifying herself, posing some questions, or inquiring whether that person would be willing to answer
some questions.207 The Court explained that in such circumstances,
there has been no constitutional infringement given the absence of a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.208 Whereas
Royer addressed the propriety of a police-individual encounter in an
airport,209 Bostick addressed the constitutionality of a law enforcement investigation while aboard a parked bus.210 In upholding the actions of the officers, the Court in Bostick affirmed law enforcement’s
prerogative to approach an individual without suspicion, and to pose
questions, even within the confines of a bus.211 The police, therefore,
are empowered to approach individuals with little or no suspicion
without implicating the Fourth Amendment.
Certainly, there is some merit to such allowances. The demands
of policing and community safety necessitate, at least in some instances, certain investigative freedoms to approach individuals without risking constitutional infractions. The propriety of the breadth of
this authority, however, is another question altogether. Such a conversation is necessarily complex. But among the critical questions that
remain is who gets selected to be approached? The Court has provided some answers.
In Whren v. United States,212 the Court held that a traffic stop is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment so long as
probable cause exists to support the stop.213 The defendants con460 U.S. 491 (1983).
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
207 See Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
208 Id. at 498.
209 Id. at 493–97.
210 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431–33. Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, linked the cases
as follows:
We have held that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach individuals at random in airport lobbies and other public places to ask them questions
and to request consent to search their luggage, so long as a reasonable person
would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate. This case requires us to
determine whether the same rule applies to police encounters that take place on a
bus.
Id. at 431.
211 Id. at 434–35.
212 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
213 See id. at 819.
205
206
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tended that the purported basis for their stop (to provide a warning
regarding a traffic violation) was pretextual and urged the adoption of
a test that inquired whether a reasonable officer would have made the
stop under the circumstances.214 The defendants argued that, given the
multitude of traffic regulations, officers would be tempted to perform
traffic stops in order to investigate other matters.215 Although the
Court acknowledged the defendants’ concern about selective enforcement of the traffic laws based upon race and other impermissible characteristics,216 the Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause, and
not the Fourth Amendment, was the proper avenue to adjudicate such
disputes.217
The position of the Court is not indefensible. First, Justice Scalia
wrote on behalf of a unanimous court.218 Second, Justice Scalia noted
the well-established principle that the existence of probable cause is
assessed objectively and is not defeated by an officer’s subjective assessments.219 Moreover, the Court recognized certain practical consequences attendant to the reasonable officer position advanced by the
defendants.220 Specifically, the Court noted that it would be difficult to
ascertain what reasonable officers would do in a given circumstance.221
To do so, Justice Scalia stated, courts would be required to “plumb the
collective consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine”
the actions of the reasonable officer.222 Justice Scalia added that such
conduct by a reasonable officer would necessarily “vary from place to
place and from time to time.”223
Virtually any decision of the Court carries societal implications.
The decision in Whren, allowing law enforcement to perform pretextual stops given the existence of probable cause, had obvious implications for automobile drivers and drivers of color in particular. This
214

Id. at 809–10.

215

Id. at 810.

See id. at 810, 813 (observing that the defendants are Black and noting their contention
that officers will employ impermissible factors when deciding which motorists to stop).
216

217

Id. at 813.

218

Id. at 807.

Id. at 812 (explaining that “[n]ot only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the
contrary”).
219

220

See id. at 813–15.

221

Id.

222

Id. at 815.

223

Id.
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effect was aggravated in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.224 In Atwater,
the Supreme Court upheld the arrest of an automobile driver for failure to wear a seatbelt.225 The driver, Gail Atwater, filed a civil action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that her arrest for a seatbelt
violation—a comparatively minor offense—violated the Fourth
Amendment.226 The Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment limits the authority of an officer to arrest an individual for minor
crimes.227 The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment contains
no such limitation.228
Together, these cases establish that the police may follow, approach, and question individuals without suspicion,229 stop them in
their vehicles on a pretextual basis,230 and arrest them for even minor
offenses.231 Subsequently, officers may freely search individuals232 and
grab areas incident to an arrest,233 and under some circumstances, may
search the passenger compartment of individuals’ vehicles.234 The Supreme Court has thus given officers the green light to pursue these
investigative tactics with few disincentives not to pursue them with
vigor. Commenting upon Bostick, Professor Devon Carbado has observed that an officer may consider an individual’s race when deciding
whether to approach and question an individual in the absence of any
suspicion and wrongdoing.235 To this, Professor Richard Frase adds
that Atwater and Whren inevitably lead to pretextual stops and arrests
that are designed “to harass . . . particular individual[s] or group[s],”
and that “the potential for abuse is great” given the multitude of traffic code regulations and the frequency with which they are violated.236
These incentives are further entrenched given the Supreme
Court’s forgiving exclusionary rule jurisprudence. When Mapp v.
224
225
226
227
228
229

532 U.S. 318 (2001).
Id. at 354–55.
Id. at 325, 347–48.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 354.
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–35

(1991).
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
232 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–36 (1973).
233 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
234 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
235 Carbado, supra note 204, at 137. Professor Carbado recommends that courts, as a part
of their totality of the circumstances review, take race into account when determining whether a
Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. Id. at 143.
236 Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 356 (2002).
230
231
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Ohio237 made the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule penalty applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, the Court unambiguously stressed that exclusion was embedded within the Constitution.238 Absent an exclusionary remedy, the
Court stated that the constitutional guarantee to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures would constitute an “empty promise.”239
The Court added that the exclusion of evidence was “the only effectively available way” to encourage law enforcement respect for these
principles.240
Yet in the decades since Mapp, the Court has moved away dramatically from this constitutional interpretation. The Court now considers the exclusionary rule a nonconstitutional principle that is
employed only when excluding evidence would sufficiently deter police misconduct.241 Exceptions allowing for officer good faith242 and
attenuating circumstances243 have not only been established but have
blossomed. The Court has also noted with some frequency the substantial costs associated with exclusion and has downplayed the significance of judicial integrity.244 Relatedly, the Court has significantly
narrowed the landscape of individuals eligible to present exclusion
claims.245
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 655.
239 Id. at 660.
240 Id. at 648, 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
241 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236, 246 (2011) (stating that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is not embodied in the Constitution and its “sole purpose” is “to deter misconduct by law enforcement”).
242 See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1995) (applying good faith exception to action
involving error by a court clerk); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–53 (1987) (applying good
faith exception to action involving reliance upon legislation).
243 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (finding Wong Sun’s confession
voluntary and therefore admissible due to attenuating circumstances despite earlier constitutional breach); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592–99 (2006) (admitting evidence obtained
when police violated knock-and-announce requirement because “[a]ttenuation also occurs when,
even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that
has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence”).
244 See United States. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (noting the exclusionary rule’s
“substantial social costs”); Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (stating that an exclusion penalty is a remedy
of “last resort”); see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”:
The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
47, 47 (2010) (asserting that judicial integrity was the original rationale for the exclusionary rule
but that its relevance has since been “eviscerated” by the Court).
245 See Julian A. Cook, III, Policing in the Era of Permissiveness: Mitigating Misconduct
Through Third-Party Standing, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1142 (2016) (discussing the narrowed
landscape of individuals eligible to assert exclusionary rule remedies since Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960)).
237
238
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Moreover, qualified immunity protects officers from civil liability
unless they violate a clearly established law. For example, in Graham
v. Connor,246 a case involving the police use of deadly force, the Court
observed that officer actions are assessed for reasonableness and that
courts should consider the “split-second judgments” that officers often
make in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances.247
Professor Daniel Epps observes that Supreme Court doctrine, such as
that enunciated in Graham, “often prevent courts from second-guessing police use of deadly force.”248 He adds that “[q]ualified immunity
routinely requires courts to say that there will be no penalty for a
police officer who has violated the Constitution,” which conveys to
law enforcement and the public “that the police are above the law.”249
The signal that the Supreme Court has sent to police organizations since the end of the Warren Court era is clear and continues to
impact the culture of law enforcement institutions. In granting and
expanding police powers and shielding police officers from responsibility, the Court has fueled a police organizational culture that encourages aggressive practices and discourages respect for constitutional
safeguards. When police officers violate Terry or engage in aggressive
behavior toward people of color, such behavior is sometimes explained as the actions of a “few bad apples.” However, I submit that
this perception is misguided.250 As Professor Barbara Armacost states,
these actions are more often the byproduct of organizational cultures.251 She writes that “[v]irtually all major police commissions and
task forces convened over the last thirty or forty years have concluded
that the patterns of repeated, wrongful incidents identified in these
troubled police departments were at least partly caused by systemic
features of police culture.”252 Professors Jeffrey A. Fagan and Alexis
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Id. at 396–97.
248 Daniel Epps, Opinion, Abolishing Qualified Immunity Is Unlikely to Alter Police Behavior, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/opinion/police-qualifiedimmunity.html [https://perma.cc/7DZS-NA3K]. See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), in
which the Court noted that qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 341.
249 Epps, supra note 248.
250 See, e.g., James Downie, Opinion, Time to Toss the ‘Bad Apples’ Excuse, WASH. POST
(May 31, 2020, 5:09 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/31/time-toss-badapples-excuse/ [https://perma.cc/M9GQ-6MWT]; Sean Illing, Why the Policing Problem Isn’t
About “A Few Bad Apples,” VOX (June 6, 2020, 8:01 AM) https://www.vox.com/identities/2020/
6/2/21276799/george-floyd-protest-criminal-justice-paul-butler [https://perma.cc/3CFK-684S].
251 Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 453, 457 (2004).
252 Id.
246
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D. Campbell add that police culture affects “the going rate of aggressiveness in citizen-police interactions, perceptions of the legitimacy of
law and when violations are appropriate, and the parameters of situations in which violence is justified against certain citizens.”253
Undoubtedly, numerous factors shape police culture, and by no
means are police cultures uniform in their characteristics.254 However,
when the Supreme Court over the course of several decades renders
judgments that enhance police powers and largely shield the police
from accountability, it defies logic to suggest that police organizations
are not influenced. Police behavior will respond accordingly, and aggressive conduct will at times be a byproduct of these investigative
freedoms. When the Court grants police the authority to “stop and
frisk,” officers will, in turn, “stop and frisk,” and they will not infrequently push and exceed those legal boundaries. And when the Court
announces a new principle that forgives officer noncompliance with
reasonable suspicion safeguards, as it did in Strieff, then officers will
take notice and act in accordance with their newly granted investigative freedoms.
CONCLUSION
In the post-Strieff world, is it any wonder why three Aurora, Colorado police officers acted in such an aggressive manner toward Elijah
McClain?255 We may never know the impetus underlying the officers’
conduct. What is certain, however, is that decades of Supreme Court
precedent laid the foundation for such aggressive police behaviors.
The Court has steadily and consistently encouraged law enforcement
to flout constitutional safeguards, and Strieff further entrenches this
most regrettable history. Strieff encourages the very problems that are
in desperate need of correction. Its lasting and unfortunate legacy will
undoubtedly be felt by all; however, predominately minority communities will likely experience its ramifications most acutely.256 History
Fagan & Campbell, supra note 48, at 969.
Professor Samuel Walker notes that police cultures are not homogeneous. See Samuel
Walker, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police Reforms
Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57, 69 (2012). He states, for example, that in recent
decades the demographics of police departments in this country have changed “dramatically.”
Id. He also asserts that police forces are now much more diversified in terms of racial, ethnic,
gender, sexual orientation, and educational representation. Id. And he contends that this diversity has resulted in “significant variations in attitudes” concerning aggressive policing tactics. Id.
at 70–71.
255 See supra notes 9–26 and accompanying text.
256 See Case Comment, supra note 123, at 346 (“For [the Strieff majority], the boost to the
efficacy of suspicionless stops must have been more societally valuable than diminished Fourth
253
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certainly suggests such an outcome. Law enforcement has traditionally
targeted these neighborhoods and disproportionately victimized minority residents through aggressive police strategies and tactics.257
Elijah McClain’s sudden and premature death at the hands of
three police officers was senseless, needless, and without any plausible
community safety justification.258 Yet his story has become all too familiar. From coast to coast this theme has been replayed, with each
instance differentiated only by its distinctive facts.259 Nobody should
have been surprised by what happened to Elijah McClain, nor should
they be when this happens to others in the years to come given the
current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence, which continues to afford police officers significant deference with no real accountability.260

Amendment protection, increased incentive for police to abuse their discretion, and heightened
justifiable distrust of police in minority and poor neighborhoods.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Chemerinsky: Has the Supreme Court Dealt a Blow to the Fourth Amendment?, ABA J. (Aug. 2,
2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_has_the_supreme_court_
dealt_a_blow_to_the_fourth_amendment [https://perma.cc/URG2-3KHA] (noting that “Strieff
was decided at a time of great social tension about policing, especially in minority
communities”).
257 See supra Part I.
258 See Katie Shepherd, An Unarmed 23-Year-Old Black Man Died After Police Stopped
Him. The Colorado Governor Wants a New Probe, WASH. POST (June 25, 2020, 6:35 AM), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/25/colorado-elijah-mcclain-death/ [https://perma.cc/
E24K-AL9T].
259 See Scott Wilson, Elijah’s McClain’s Death Reflects Failures of White, Suburban Police
Departments, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020, 7:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
elijah-mcclains-death-reflects-failures-of-white-suburban-police-departments/2020/09/02/
8750a726-e3e4-11ea-9dd2-95be2a2bef2e_story.html [https://perma.cc/AHV8-SAMQ] (detailing
various instances of police killings involving African Americans).
260 Cf. Jackie Spinner, Opinion, Elijah McClain’s Final Words Haunt Me as the Parent of a
Child Who Is ‘Different,’ WASH. POST. (June 29, 2020, 12:50 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/elijah-mcclains-last-words-haunt-me-could-thathappen-my-son/ [https://perma.cc/RS2B-4PXY] (expressing fears as the mother of an autistic son
that law enforcement will misconstrue his actions and react aggressively).

